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Abstract—We consider the problem of secure distributed ma-
trix multiplication in which a user wishes to compute the product
of two matrices with the assistance of honest but curious servers.
In this paper, we answer the following question: Is it beneficial
to offload the computations if security is a concern? We answer
this question in the affirmative by showing that by adjusting
the parameters in a polynomial code we can obtain a trade-off
between the user’s and the servers’ computational time.
Indeed, we show that if the computational time complexity of
an operation in Fq is at most Zq and the computational time
complexity of multiplying two n× n matrices is O(nωZq) then,
by optimizing the trade-off, the user together with the servers
can compute the multiplication in O(n4− 6ω+1Zq) time.
We also show that if the user is only concerned in optimizing
the download rate, a common assumption in the literature, then
the problem can be converted into a simple private information
retrieval problem by means of a scheme we call Private Oracle
Querying. However, this comes at large upload and computational
costs for both the user and the servers.
I. INTRODUCTION
There has been a growing interest in applying coding
theoretic methods for Secure Distributed Matrix Multiplica-
tion (SDMM) [1]–[7]. In SDMM, a user has two matrices,
A ∈ Fr×sq and B ∈ Fs×tq , and is interested in obtaining
AB ∈ Fr×tq with the help of N servers without leaking
any information about A or B to any server. All servers are
assumed to be honest and responsive, but are curious, in that
any T of them may collude to try to deduce information about
either A or B. The original performance metric used in the
literature is the download cost [1], i.e. the total amount of
data downloaded by the user from the servers, with later work
considering the total communication cost [6], [8], [9].
In [10], the following existential issue is raised with the
SDMM setting: Is it beneficial to offload the computations
if security is a concern? Indeed computing the product AB
locally is both secure and has zero communication cost. The
authors in [10] circumvent this by changing the setting so that
the user does not possess the matrices A and B. This forces
communication to be the only way for the user to obtain the
product AB. This however, is solving a problem quite different
from the one initially posed in [1].
This work was supported in part by NSF Grant CCF 1817635 and CNS 1801630.
In this paper we revisit the original setting of SDMM and
show that offloading the computations can be justified from a
computational perspective. More precisely, we show that by
adjusting the parameters in a polynomial code we can obtain
a trade-off between the user’s and the servers’ computational
time, as shown in Figure 1a. Indeed, if the computational
time complexity of an operation in Fq is at most Zq and
the computational time complexity of multiplying two n × n
matrices is O(nωZq) then, by optimizing the trade-off, the
user together with the servers can compute the multiplication
in O(n4− 6ω+1Zq) time, as shown in Figure 1b.
A. Related Work
For distributed computations, Polynomial codes were origi-
nally introduced in [11] in a slightly different setting, namely
to mitigate stragglers in distributed matrix multiplication. This
work was followed by a series of works [12]–[15]. However,
the polynomial codes in these works are not designed to ensure
security, making them not applicable to settings where there
are privacy concerns related to the data being used.
B. Main Contributions
The main contributions of this work are as follows.
• In Section III, we show that if the performance metric for
SDMM is solely the download cost, then, by transforming
the problem into a private information retrieval problem,
we can obtain download costs much lower than those ob-
tained using polynomial codes. This, however, comes at
exponential upload and computational costs. The scheme,
however, can be readily implemented in settings where
the download cost is the performance metric of interest,
like in [8] or [10].
• In Section V, we show the existence of a regime under
which outsourcing computations with security constraints
is beneficial. We do this by analyzing the computational
time complexity of a family of polynomial codes known
as gap additive secure polynomial (GASP) codes [3], [4],
and show that by adjusting the code parameters we can
obtain a trade-off between the user’s and the servers’
computational time. By optimizing this trade-off we can
show that if the time complexity of an operation in Fq
is at most Zq and a matrix multiplication algorithm for
n × n matrices with time complexity O(nωZq) is used,
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(a) Trade-off between the user and servers’ computation exponents, e.g.
if the servers use the standard matrix multiplication algorithm, ω = 3,
and the user sets its computational complexity exponent to 2.5 then
the server will also have a computational complexity exponent of 2.5.
(b) Total time complexity for GASP when choosing best trade-off
between user and servers’ time complexity exponent as a function of
the exponent of the matrix multiplication algorithm, ω. We show that ε
can be chosen so that the total time complexity has exponent 4− 6
ω+1
.
Fig. 1: The figures pertain to the setting in Section V where we analyze the computational complexity of GASP codes. In this
setting, r = s = t = n, the security parameter T is a constant, the partitioning parameters K = L = nε, and the servers use a
matrix multiplication algorithm with computational complexity O(nω).
then the total time taken for the user to retrieve AB with
the help of the servers is given by O(n4− 6ω+1Zq).
II. NOTATION
Our analysis in sections IV and V will require asymptotic
notation for multivariate functions. As shown in [16], care
must be taken when generalizing the asymptotic notation from
univariate to multivariate functions.
Hence, we apply the following asymptotic notation. For
a function f mapping D ⊆ Rn to R, such that D is in
each coordinate not upper bounded, O(f(x)) is the set of
all g : D → R such that there exist N, c ∈ R+ with
|g(x)| ≤ c|f(x)| for all x with N ≤ xi for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
We define Ω(f(x)) in the same way with the inequality
replaced by |g(x)| ≥ c|f(x)|.
We assume a base field Fp over which all elementary
operations (addition, subtraction, multiplication, division) take
constant time. We also assume that transmitting symbols in Fp
between the user and the servers takes constant time.
When constructing polynomial codes we will need to con-
sider a field extension Fq of Fp. We assume that any elemen-
tary operation or generation of a random element in Fq takes
time at most Zq . The possible values for Zq depend on the
representation of the field elements, e.g. powers of a generator
of the group of units F×q or polynomials in Fp[X]/(f) (with
f ∈ Fp[X] irreducible and of degree d with pd = q), and of
the underlying machine, e.g. a Turing machine or a Boolean
circuit [17], and its implementation [18], [19].
We set Zq = O(log(q)γ), i.e. Zq is polylogarithmic. If only
additions and multiplications are used, for example, we can set
γ = 2 if we use standard polynomial multiplication. This can
be reduced by using better multiplication algorithms.
Next, we assume that the transmission of one q-ary symbol
has communication cost at most Cq . If we use the usual
polynomial representation, then Cq = O(log(q)).
We denote by M(r, s, t) the computation complexity of
multiplying an r × s matrix by an s × t matrix. The study
of the computational complexity of matrix multiplication is
one of the main topics in algebraic complexity theory.
The most understood case is for square matrices, i.e. when
r = s = t = n. In [20], Strassen presented the first algorithm
outperforming the standard O(n3). Strassen’s algorithm has
computational complexity O(nlog2(7)) ≈ O(n2.81). This was
further improved to ≈ O(n2.37) by Coppersmith, Winograd,
and Le Gall [21], [22]. Since any entry of both n×n matrices
has to be used in general, the number of operations is at least
Ω(n2). It is an open problem if there exists an algorithm which
uses Θ(n2) operations.
III. PRIVATE ORACLE QUERYING
In this section we show that by transforming the SDMM
problem into a private information retrieval problem we can
obtain schemes with download costs much lower than polyno-
mial codes. These schemes, however, have exponential upload
and computational costs. They serve as an example of why we
cannot use the download cost as the sole performance metric
as was done originally in the literature.
The scheme, however, can be readily implemented in set-
tings where the download cost is the performance metric of
interest, like in [8] or [10].
We name this scheme a private oracle querying scheme
and begin by giving a simplified example of it. It consists
in transforming the secure distributed matrix multiplication
problem into a private information retrieval problem [23].
The reason for naming it Oracle Querying, is that the tech-
nique applies to settings more general than matrix multiplica-
tion. Indeed the same can be done even for non-computable
functions, say if the servers have access to some oracle.
A. An Example
Let A,B ∈ F2 and the number of servers be N = 2
none of which collude, thus T = 1, r = s = t = 1, and
q = 2. The user is interested in AB ∈ F2. The Private
Oracle Querying scheme consists in transforming SDMM into
a private information retrieval problem.
The servers begin by precomputing all M = qs(r+t) = 4
possible multiplications, shown in Table I. Then, each server
stores all possible multiplications in its database, i.e. the third
column of Table I.
A B AB
0 0 0
0 1 0
1 0 0
1 1 1
TABLE I: Each server stores the third column in the table.
The user can obtain the multiplication privately via a private
information retrieval scheme where the user wants one file
out of the database, D, of M = qs(r+t) = 4 files each one
of length rt = 1. This can be done, for example, by using
a simple secret sharing scheme achieving a download rate of
D = N−TN = 12 , as shown in Table II.
Server 1 Server 2
Query: q q + ei
Response: 〈D, q〉 〈D, q + ei〉
TABLE II: To privately retrieve the i-th entry in the database
from the servers the user generates a vector q ∈ FMrt2
uniformly at random. He then sends q to Server 1 and q+ ei
to Server 2 where ei is the i-th vector in the standard basis of
FMrt2 . The Servers perform an inner product of the received
query with their database and sends it back to the user. The
user then retrieves the i-th entry in the database by subtracting
the responses.
B. The Scheme
We now present the scheme, which we refer to as private
oracle querying.
Theorem 1. Let N be the number of servers, T the se-
curity parameter, A ∈ Fr×sq and B ∈ Fs×tq . Then, the
secure distributed matrix multiplication problem for computing
AB ∈ Fr×tq can be solved by solving a private information
retrieval problem where each server has M = qs(r+t) files,
each one of length rt.
Proof. As a preprocessing step of the scheme, each server
computes all M = qs(r+t) possible matrix multiplications and
stores them in its database. Considering each result of each
multiplication as a file, each server then has M files, each
of size rt. Thus, the secure distributed matrix multiplication
problem can be reinterpreted as a private information retrieval
problem where each server has M files, each of size rt.
If the field q is large enough, the user can use a simple
secret sharing scheme.
Corollary 1. Under the same hypothesis of Theorem 1, for
large enough field size q, there exists a secure distributed
matrix multiplication scheme with download rate D = N−TN .
Proof. This rate can be achieved by using the construction
in Section III B of [24]. The large field size is needed to
guarantee the existence of an MDS code.
The download capacity for private information retrieval is
known [25]. However, as the number of files grows, this
capacity converges to the rate in Corollary 1.
If one uses the download rate as the sole performance
metric for the setting in [1], these private information retrieval
codes can outperform the polynomial codes in [1]–[7]. They,
however, have two shortcomings.
First, the upload cost is exponential, since even a single
query will have the size of the whole database, qs(r+t).
Second, the time to generate a single query, Ω(qs(r+t)), is
much longer than the time for the user to calculate the matrix
multiplication locally using the standard matrix multiplication
algorithm, O(rstZq).
In other settings, where the user does not have access to both
matrices and computational costs are not considered, like in
[8] or [10], private oracle querying can be readily applied.
IV. POLYNOMIAL CODES
Polynomial codes for secure distributed matrix multiplica-
tion were first introduced in [1] and later improved on in
[1]–[7]. Our goal is to highlight the existence of a regime
where securely offloading the computation to the workers is
beneficial. Towards that goal we analyze the communication
and computation complexity of a family of polynomial codes
called GASP codes [3], [4]. Since we are using upper bounds
to show that SDMM is beneficial, constructions which outper-
form GASP codes will also be upper bounded by the expres-
sions shown. The analysis shown here can be straightforwardly
extended to other polynomial codes in the literature.
A. Constructing GASP Codes
Let A ∈ Fr×sq and B ∈ Fs×tq be partitioned as follows:
A =
A1...
AK
 , B = [B1 · · · BL] ,
so that AB =
A1B1 · · · A1BL... . . . ...
AKB1 · · · AKBL
 .
The user chooses T matrices Rt over Fq of the
same size as the Ak independently and uniformly at
random, and T matrices St of the same size as the
B` independently and uniformly at random. A polyno-
mial code is a choice of α = (α1, . . . , αK+T ) ∈ NK+T and
β = (β1, . . . , βL+T ) ∈ NL+T defining the polynomials
f(x) =
K∑
k=1
Akx
αk +
T∑
t=1
Rtx
αK+t ,
g(x) =
L∑
`=1
B`x
β` +
T∑
t=1
Stx
βL+t
and their product h(x) = f(x)g(x).
Given N servers, the user chooses evaluation points
a1, . . . , aN ∈ Fqr for some finite extension Fqr of Fq . They
then send f(an) and g(an) to server n = 1, . . . , N , who
computes the product f(an)g(an) = h(an) and transmits it
back to the user. The user then interpolates the polynomial
h(x) given all of the evaluations h(an), and attempts to
recover all products AkB` from the coefficients of h(x).
GASP codes [3], [4] are a family of polynomial codes
constructed via a combinatorial table called the degree table.
In Table III we show the upload and download time com-
plexity for GASP codes. These values follow directly from the
analysis done in Appendix B of [9].
Operation Time Complexity
Upload O(Ns( r
K
+ t
L
)Cq)
Download O(N rt
KL
Cq)
TABLE III: Communication time for GASP codes.
B. The Computational Complexity of GASP codes
In this section we perform an analysis on the computational
time complexity of GASP codes. The computations can be
separated into three parts.
1) User Encoding: the computation time it takes the user
to generate the evaluations that will be uploaded to the
servers.
2) Server Computation: the computation time it will take
each server to multiply the two evaluations it receives
from the user.
Operation Time Complexity
User Encoding O(Ns(r + t+ T ( r
K
+ t
L
))Zq)
Server Computation O(M ( r
K
, s, t
L
)Zq)
User Decoding O(NrtZq)
TABLE IV: Computation time for GASP codes.
3) User Decoding: the computation time it will take the user
to decode the matrix multiplication from what it received
from the servers.
Theorem 2. The computational time complexity for GASP
codes is given in Table IV.
Proof.
1) User Encoding: The number of additions and multipli-
cations in Fq needed to compute an evaluation of f and
g are (K+T ) rsK and (L+T )
st
L . The result follows from
performing this N times, once for each server.
2) Server Computation: Each server must compute the
product of two matrices of dimensions rK × s and s× tL .
3) User Decoding: We assume that the inverted generalized
Vandermonde matrix is precomputed. Then, the interpo-
lation of AiBj is a linear combination of the servers’ an-
swers. The number of additions in Fq is KL(N −1) rK tL
and the number of multiplications is KLN rK
t
L .
If using the standard matrix multiplication algorithm then
we can substitute M ( rK , s, tL) = O ( rstKL).
V. CHOOSING THE RIGHT PARAMETERS
In this section we show that, by choosing the right parame-
ters for GASP codes, secure distributed matrix multiplication
can speed up the computation time when compared to the user
performing the computation locally.
We will analyze the following setting. We consider square
matrices, i.e. r = s = t = n, assume that the security
parameter, T , is a constant, and that the partitioning parameter
K = L = nε for some 0 ≤ ε ≤ 1. We also assume that the
servers multiply two n× n matrices using an algorithm with
computational complexity O(nω). Our goal is to study the
time complexity of GASP codes as n grows.
In [4], it was shown that for GASP codes we have the
bounds KL ≤ N ≤ (K + T )(L+ T ). Thus, N = O(K2).
We calculate the time complexity for each of the servers.
Proposition 1. Let r = s = t = n, T be a constant, K = L,
and O(nω) be the computational complexity of the algorithm
which the servers use to multiply an n × n matrix. Then,
the time complexity for each server to compute the matrix
multiplication sent to it in the GASP scheme is O( nωKω−1Zq).
Proof. The rectangular matrices each server has to multiply,
say F and G, have dimensions nK ×n and n× nK , so that they
can be split into
F =
[
F1 · · · FK
]
, G =
G1...
GK
 ,
so that Fi and Gi are square matrices with shape nK × nK and
F ·G =
K∑
i=1
Fi ·Gi.
The right hand side can be evaluated by K matrix multipli-
cations requiring O(( nK )ω) (with 2 ≤ ω) field operations and
(K − 1)( nK )2 additions of field elements. So the total time
complexity is
O(((K − 1)( nK )2 +K( nK )ω)Zq) = O( n
ω
Kω−1Zq).
Proposition 2. Assume the setting of Proposition 1 and that
K = L = nε. Then, the time complexity for each operation in
GASP is given in Table V.
Proof. The proof follows from substituting the values in the
hypothesis and Proposition 1 into Theorem 2.
Operation Time Complexity
Query Encoding O(n2+2εZq)
User Decoding O(n2+2εZq)
Each Server O(nω−ε(ω−1)Zq)
Upload O(n2+εCq)
Download O(n2Cq)
TABLE V: Time complexity for the setting in Proposition 2.
We will now deal with the field size. Indeed, to use GASP
codes we need the field size to satisfy certain bounds. Thus,
by making n grow, it will also be necessary to make the field
size q to grow.
Proposition 3. Assume the setting in Proposition 2 and that
Zq = O(log(q)γ). Then Zq = O(log(n)γ).
Proof. The proof for GASP codes in [9, Lemma 2], shows
an argument for the evaluation points of f and g to exist if
q >
(
2
(
N
T
)
+ 1
)
· J .
Moreover, J =
∑
j∈J j where J is the set of exponents
in h(x) =
∑
j∈J hjx
j with #J = N . Since we use GASP
codes, all entries in the degree table are between zero and
W = 2KL+ (T − 1)(K + 1),
so that,
J ≤
W∑
j=0
j =
W (W + 1)
2
= O(W 2) = O(K2(L+ T )2).
In particular, a field size larger than
(
2
(
N
T
)
+ 1
)
· W (W+1)2
is sufficient.
An application of the Stirling approximation
n! ∼ √2pin(n/e)n yields(
N
T
)
≤ N !
T !(|N − T |)! =
O(N !)
Ω(T !)Ω((|N − T |)!)
=
O(√2piN(N/e)N )
Ω(
√
2piT (T/e)T )Ω(
√
2pi|N − T |(|N − T |/e)|N−T |)
=O
(
NN+
1
2√
2piTT+
1
2 |N − T ||N−T |+ 12 e
N−T−|N−T |
)
=O
(
NN+
1
2√
2piTT+
1
2 |N − T ||N−T |+ 12
)
,
as N − T − |N − T | ≤ 0, so that(
2
(
N
T
)
+ 1
)
· W (W + 1)
2
= O
((
N
T
)
W 2
)
= O
(
NN+
1
2K2(L+ T )2
TT+
1
2 |N − T ||N−T |+ 12
)
is a lower bound on the sufficient field size.
Using the same exemplary parameters as in Section V, i.e.,
T = constant, K = L = nε, and N ∈ O(K2), noting that
T ≤ N , this simplifies to O(n2ε(T+2)). Using a field size in
O(n2ε(T+2)) implies
Zq = O(log(n2ε(T+2))γ) = O(log(n)γ).
We are now ready to calculate the total time complexity
when implementing GASP codes.
Theorem 3. Assume the setting in Proposition 2. Then, the
total time complexity of GASP is O(nmax{ε+ω−εω,2+2ε}Zq)
Proof. We begin by noting that since Cq = O(log(q)), it
follows that Cq = O(Zq).
Since all servers perform their computations in parallel, the
total time complexity, T , is the sum of the time complexities
in Table V,
T = O((K2n2 +K2n2 + nωKω−1 )Zq + (Kn2 + n2)Cq)
= O(nmax{ε+ω−εω,2+2ε}Zq).
The parameter ε controls the trade-off between computa-
tional costs at the client (O(n2+2εZq)) versus computational
costs at each of the servers (O(nε+ω−εωZq)). This trade-off,
shown in Figure 1a, is linear in the exponents. By choosing
ε carefully we can bound the total time complexity, as shown
in Figure 1b.
Corollary 2. Assume the setting in Proposition 2. The min-
imum total time complexity for GASP is O(n4− 6ω+1Zq) for
ε = ω−2ω+1 .
Thus, by using GASP codes, the user can perform the
matrix multiplication in time O(n4− 6ω+1Zq) as opposed to the
O(nω) time it would take to do locally. Note here that since
Zq = O(log(n)γ), this is always an improvement. Also, if the
user uses Fq as the base field, i.e. for very large fields, then
Zq can be taken to be constant.
Finally, we note that the analysis trivially holds for polyno-
mial codes that outperform GASP codes since all results were
proven via upper bounds. More so, since our analysis is done
using asymptotic notation, the improvements would have to
be by more than just constants to obtain better results.
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